SLOPSHOPPER

verify-board

Verify Board

guardcommandtoastprocess
★ 1,095v0.1.1Apache-2.0updated 2026-10-23YeonwooSung/my-claude-code-mods/verify-board
A shopper browsing a rack in a slop shop
Preview · a replayed session in a sandbox
claude · ~/work/app · verify-board
› fix the failing auth test and add an audit log call ⏺ Read(src/auth.ts) ⎿ Read 6 lines ⏺ Update(src/auth.ts) ⎿ Added 2 lines, removed 1 line ⏺ Bash(bun test) ⎿ 3 pass, 1 fail ● Done. refresh now rejects expired claims and logs an audit event. ✻ Worked for 42s · done 4:20 PM › /verify ⎿ verify-board: Verify Board — observed checks only; commands are not coverage guarantees. ⎿ verify-board: No checks observed. Run a verification command. ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── › ? for shortcuts
README

Verify Board

Local Claude Code mod. Install: claude plugin install verify-board@my-claude-code-mods --scope user, then reload plugins.

Revision-aware verification results: PASS, FAIL, STALE and UNKNOWN.

Commands

/verify help
/verify [list | reset]
/verify reset

Reports are returned as command text, usable in terminal/Desktop/headless sessions. State is isolated by cwd and session ID in the plugin store; resuming the same identity restores it. Reset clears this mod's records only. Observations never block tools or execute commands twice. No network calls. Obvious secrets and terminal escapes are masked before storage/display; masking is best effort.

Limits and verification

First release: see design for exact analysis limits. Git commands have a 10-second timeout. Lists cap at 200 entries and repository scans at 2,000 paths / 2 MiB; incomplete evidence is reported. Commands use explicit data entry; no model inference or automatic source editing. Actual engine tests cover command behavior and forwarding; live terminal/Desktop pixels have not been checked.

Development: npm test, CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_FUNCTION_HOOKS=1 claude plugin test verify-board, npx tsc -p verify-board. Engine typechecking needs local ignored declarations. Canonical runtime sources are in scripts/workflow/; run node scripts/sync-workflow.mjs after editing.

Example

/verify
npm test
/verify list

Snapshots include HEAD, tracked binary diffs and up to 200 untracked files (2 MiB total). Missing evidence stays UNKNOWN. Only an explicit conservative list of check commands is recognized; this is not a coverage guarantee.

Local preview before marketplace publication: claude --plugin-dir ./verify-board from this checkout. Engine tests were run with Claude Code 2.1.302.

Evidence boundary: dirty submodules and symlink snapshot/review targets remain unknown/incomplete; symlink targets are not read. Verification signatures include the staged index separately from working changes. Ignored files remain outside Git-based evidence.

Hooks, programs and data flow

Records recognized verification outcomes and compares revision fingerprints.

The command.run hook answers only /verify with local report/control text. It does not intercept unrelated slash commands. The tool.call hook forwards each original event once and returns its outcome unchanged; observer failures do not retry a tool. No tool.check, permission-mode or Remote Control override is installed.

The following complete argv templates describe every program launched with process.run. Each item is an argument array passed directly to the host, with no shell command parsing. <cwd>/<repo> are the current project or Git root, <base> is the validated selected ref, <manifest> is package.json or package-lock.json, and <path> is a selected project file. [--cached] denotes two fixed variants, with and without that argument. Every call has a 10-second timeout.

git -C <repo> rev-parse --show-toplevel
git -C <repo> rev-parse --verify HEAD
git -C <repo> diff --no-ext-diff --no-textconv --binary --ignore-submodules=none [--cached] HEAD --
git -C <repo> status --porcelain=v1 -z --untracked-files=all --ignore-submodules=none
git -C <repo> ls-files --others --exclude-standard -z

Only git is accepted by this adapter's process bridge. Dynamic path/ref arguments are project evidence, not scripts fetched from a server. These Git commands query local history, status and diffs; none is fetch, push, install or a shell interpreter. Other features' version/environment/replay bridges are absent from this mod.

This mod makes no tool.call of its own. The common Bash-replay implementation is not included in its generated adapter; observing/forwarding an existing tool call does not create another call.

There are no HTTP requests, telemetry destinations or automatic uploads in this feature. Local read results support analysis/fingerprints and local report text; masked feature records go only to the plugin store under the current cwd/session identity. No project build, startup, settings or instruction files are edited. User/agent tool calls that are forwarded retain their independent behavior and destinations.

For review: String.raw/regular-expression literals in the redactor are string-pattern data, never a shell program. Template literals beginning # format record numbers. constructor names ordinary TypeScript class initialization. These are not credential reads or command execution. Runtime command access is limited to the concrete cases documented above.

Directory review: read-to-process boundary

Project file bytes and local HEAD/index/worktree evidence are read to calculate revision fingerprints and evaluate previously observed verification results.

The destination of process.run is the local Git executable. Its argv contains the documented Git subcommand/options and local project paths or selected refs, with the session cwd as the working directory. File contents are not inserted into shell code, sent as stdin, or posted to a server by this adapter. Git reads the repository locally and returns stdout/stderr for this analysis. Reports return to the local slash-command caller; persisted feature records go to this plugin’s local cwd/session-scoped store. This mod has no HTTP upload, remote recipient, server-provided command source or own tool replay. It forwards independently requested tool calls once; any network activity of those calls belongs to their original inputs and permissions. The program list above describes what the mod requests; installed executables and user/system configuration retain their own capabilities.

Source 4 files
hooks/register.ts 81 lines
1import type { EngineInterface, Register } from 'claude-code'
2import { object, revision, safeText, safeData, reportText, type Observation, type Port } from './core/runtime.ts'
3export interface Model { data: object; command(args: string, io: Port): Promise<string>; observe?(event: Observation, io: Port): Promise<void> }
4import { Feature } from './core/feature.ts'
5const name = 'verify-board'
6const command = 'verify'
7type AdapterState = { queue: Promise<unknown>; replaying: boolean }
8const state: AdapterState = { queue: Promise.resolve(), replaying: false }
9const observesTools = 'observe' in Feature.prototype
10const serial = <T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> => {
11  const work = state.queue.then(fn); state.queue = work.catch(() => {}); return work
12}
13const port = async ($: EngineInterface): Promise<Port> => {
14  const cwd = await $.session.cwd()
15  const unavailable = async (): Promise<never> => { throw new Error('Capability not used by this feature') }
16  const io: Port = { cwd, read: unavailable, run: unavailable, env: unavailable, revision: async () => undefined }
17  io.read = async path => await $.fs.read(path)
18  io.bytes = async path => (await $.fs.read(path, { as: 'bytes' })).base64
19  io.stat = path => $.fs.stat(path)
20  io.run = argv => {
21    if (argv[0] !== 'git') throw new Error('Only local Git evidence commands are supported')
22    return $.process.run(['git', ...argv.slice(1)], { cwd, timeoutMs: 10_000 })
23  }
24  io.revision = () => revision(io)
25  return io
26}
27const identity = ($: EngineInterface) => Promise.all([$.session.cwd(), $.session.id()])
28const transact = async ($: EngineInterface, fn: (model: Model, io: Port) => Promise<string | void>, expected: string[], forceSave = false): Promise<string> => serial(async () => {
29  const [io, id] = await Promise.all([port($), $.session.id()])
30  if (io.cwd !== expected[0] || id !== expected[1]) return 'Session changed; operation not applied'
31  const key = `${name}:v1:${JSON.stringify([io.cwd, id])}`
32  const raw = await $.store.get(key)
33  const loaded = await identity($)
34  if (loaded[0] !== expected[0] || loaded[1] !== expected[1]) return 'Session changed; operation not applied'
35  const model = new Feature(raw)
36  const previous = JSON.stringify(safeData(model.data))
37  const result = await fn(model, io)
38  // No raw event payloads reach storage. Keep the serialized state bounded.
39  const serialized = JSON.stringify(safeData(model.data))
40  if (forceSave || serialized !== previous) {
41    if (serialized.length > 256 * 1024) throw new Error('state limit exceeded; not saved')
42    try { await $.store.set(key, JSON.parse(serialized)) }
43    catch { throw new Error('state not saved; retry after storage recovers') }
44  }
45  return reportText(result ?? '')
46})
47export const register: Register = on => {
48  on('session.start', async ($, e, next) => {
49    try { await $.command.register({ name: command, description: `${name}: /${command} help` }) } catch { /* Startup still forwards. */ }
50    return next(e)
51  })
52  on('command.run', { command }, async ($, e) => {
53    try {
54      const expected = await identity($)
55      return { text: await transact($, async (model, io) => {
56        if ((e.args ?? '').trim() === 'reset') { model.data = new Feature().data; return `${name}: records reset` }
57        return model.command(e.args ?? '', io)
58    }, expected, (e.args ?? '').trim() === 'reset') } } catch (error) { return { text: `${name}: ${safeText(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error)}` } }
59  })
60  on('tool.call', async ($, e, next) => {
61    const ownReplay = state.replaying && (next.origin?.plugin === name || next.origin?.plugin.startsWith(name + '@'))
62    if (!observesTools || ownReplay) return next(e)
63    const expected = await identity($).catch(() => undefined)
64    let before: string | undefined
65    if (['verify-board', 'handoff-pack'].includes(name) && e.tool === 'Bash') {
66      try { before = await (await port($)).revision() } catch { /* Unknown evidence. */ }
67    }
68    // next runs outside observation catch: an observer never retries a tool or hides its exception.
69    const result = await next(e)
70    try {
71      const now = await Promise.all([$.session.cwd(), $.session.id()])
72      if (!expected || expected[0] !== now[0] || expected[1] !== now[1]) return result
73      await transact($, async (model, io) => {
74        const after = before !== undefined ? await io.revision() : undefined
75        await model.observe?.({ tool: e.tool, input: object(e), result, before, after }, io)
76      }, expected)
77    } catch { try { $.ui.toast(`${name}: observation not saved`) } catch { /* Noninteractive host. */ } }
78    return result
79  })
80}
81
hooks/core/runtime.ts 132 lines
1import { redactSecrets } from './redact.ts'
2export type ProcessResult = { exitCode: number; stdout: string; stderr: string; isStdoutTruncated?: boolean; isStderrTruncated?: boolean }
3export type Port = {
4  cwd: string
5  read(path: string): Promise<string>
6  bytes?(path: string): Promise<string>
7  stat?(path: string): Promise<{ isLink: boolean }>
8  list?(path: string): Promise<string[]>
9  run(argv: readonly string[]): Promise<ProcessResult>
10  env(name: string): Promise<string | undefined>
11  revision(): Promise<string | undefined>
12  replay?(command: string): Promise<unknown>
13}
14export type Observation = { tool: string; input: Record<string, unknown>; result: unknown; before?: string; after?: string }
15export function object(v: unknown): Record<string, unknown> { return v !== null && typeof v === 'object' && !Array.isArray(v) ? v as Record<string, unknown> : {} }
16export function safeText(v: unknown, limit = 4000): string {
17  const text = String(v ?? '').replace(/\x1b\][^\x07]*(?:\x07|\x1b\\)/g, '').replace(/\x1b\[[0-?]*[ -/]*[@-~]/g, '').replace(/[\x00-\x08\x0b-\x1f\x7f-\x9f]/g, '')
18  // Some masking patterns backtrack on very long words. Omit an oversized line whole:
19  // cutting it first could expose an unterminated quoted secret.
20  const lines = text.split('\n')
21  // Dropping a credential's opening line could expose its quoted continuation.
22  if (lines.some(line => line.length > 8192 && /["'\\]|password|passwd|pwd|token|key|secret|authorization|credential|cookie/i.test(line))) return '[OMITTED: oversized sensitive value]'
23  return redactSecrets(lines.map(line => line.length > 8192 ? '[OMITTED: oversized line]' : line).join('\n')).slice(0, limit)
24}
25export function hash(text: string): string {
26  return [0, 0x9747b28c].map(seed => {
27    let h = (0x811c9dc5 ^ seed) >>> 0
28    for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i++) h = Math.imul(h ^ text.charCodeAt(i), 0x01000193)
29    return (h >>> 0).toString(16).padStart(8, '0')
30  }).join('')
31}
32export function relativePath(root: string, path: string): string | undefined {
33  const normalize = (p: string) => {
34    const parts: string[] = []
35    for (const s of p.replace(/\\/g, '/').split('/')) {
36      if (!s || s === '.') continue
37      if (s === '..') { if (!parts.length) return undefined; parts.pop() } else parts.push(s)
38    }
39    return parts.join('/')
40  }
41  const base = normalize(root); if (base === undefined) return undefined
42  const full = normalize(path.startsWith('/') ? path : `${root}/${path}`)
43  if (full === undefined) return undefined
44  if (base === '') return root.startsWith('/') ? full : undefined
45  if (!(full === base || full.startsWith(base + '/'))) return undefined
46  return full.slice(base.length).replace(/^\//, '')
47}
48export function changedPaths(status: string): string[] {
49  const entries = status.split('\0'); const paths: string[] = []
50  for (let i = 0; i < entries.length; i++) {
51    const line = entries[i]!; if (line.length < 4) continue
52    paths.push(line.slice(3))
53    if (/[RC]/.test(line.slice(0, 2)) && entries[i + 1]) paths.push(entries[++i]!)
54  }
55  return [...new Set(paths)]
56}
57export async function git(io: Port, args: string[]): Promise<string> {
58  const r = await io.run(['git', '-C', io.cwd, ...args])
59  if (r.exitCode !== 0 || r.isStdoutTruncated || r.isStderrTruncated) throw new Error('Git evidence unavailable or incomplete')
60  if (r.stdout.length > 2 * 1024 * 1024) throw new Error('Git evidence exceeds 2 MiB limit')
61  return r.stdout
62}
63export async function statusPaths(io: Port): Promise<string[]> { return changedPaths(await git(io, ['status', '--porcelain=v1', '-z', '--untracked-files=all'])) }
64export async function revision(io: Port): Promise<string | undefined> {
65  try {
66    const root = (await git(io, ['rev-parse', '--show-toplevel'])).replace(/\n$/, '')
67    if (!root.startsWith('/')) return undefined
68    const repo = { ...io, cwd: root }
69    const head = await git(repo, ['rev-parse', '--verify', 'HEAD'])
70    const diff = await git(repo, ['diff', '--no-ext-diff', '--no-textconv', '--binary', '--ignore-submodules=none', 'HEAD', '--'])
71    const staged = await git(repo, ['diff', '--no-ext-diff', '--no-textconv', '--binary', '--ignore-submodules=none', '--cached', 'HEAD', '--'])
72    if (/^\+Subproject commit [a-f0-9]+-dirty$/m.test(diff) || /^\+Subproject commit [a-f0-9]+-dirty$/m.test(staged)) return undefined
73    const status = await git(repo, ['status', '--porcelain=v1', '-z', '--untracked-files=all', '--ignore-submodules=none'])
74    const paths = (await git(repo, ['ls-files', '--others', '--exclude-standard', '-z'])).split('\0').filter(Boolean).sort()
75    if (paths.length > 200) return undefined
76    const bodies: string[] = [head, diff, staged, status]; let size = diff.length + staged.length + status.length
77    for (const path of paths) {
78      if (relativePath(root, path) !== path || (io.stat && (await io.stat(`${root}/${path}`)).isLink)) return undefined
79      const body = await (io.bytes ?? io.read)(`${root}/${path}`); size += body.length
80      if (size > 2 * 1024 * 1024) return undefined
81      bodies.push(path, body)
82    }
83    return hash(JSON.stringify(bodies))
84  } catch { return undefined }
85}
86export function outcome(result: unknown): 'pass' | 'fail' | 'unknown' {
87  const a = object(result), r = object(a.result)
88  if (a.deny !== undefined) return 'unknown'
89  for (const v of [a, r]) {
90    if (['interrupted', 'cancelled', 'canceled', 'timedOut', 'timed_out', 'truncated', 'output_truncated', 'isStdoutTruncated', 'isStderrTruncated', 'backgroundedByUser', 'backgroundedByTurnAbort', 'backgroundedToDeliverMessage'].some(k => v[k] === true)) return 'unknown'
91    if (['task_id', 'taskId', 'backgroundTaskId', 'background_task_id', 'timedOutAfterMs', 'rawOutputPath', 'persistedOutputPath'].some(k => v[k] !== undefined && v[k] !== null && v[k] !== '')) return 'unknown'
92  }
93  if (a.isError === true) return 'fail'
94  const text = [a.text, r.stdout, r.stderr].filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string').join('\n').replace(/\x1b\[[0-?]*[ -/]*[@-~]/g, '')
95  if (text.length > 65_536) return 'unknown'
96  if (/^# fail [1-9]\d*\s*$/m.test(text) || /^\s*Tests(?::|\s+)[^\n]*\b[1-9]\d* failed\b/m.test(text) || /^=+[^\n]*\b[1-9]\d* (?:failed|errors?)\b/m.test(text) || /^test result: FAILED\./m.test(text) || /^\s*--- FAIL: /m.test(text)) return 'fail'
97  const code = 'exitCode' in r ? r.exitCode : r.exit_code
98  if ('exitCode' in r || 'exit_code' in r) return typeof code === 'number' && Number.isInteger(code) ? code === 0 ? 'pass' : 'fail' : 'unknown'
99  // Builtin Bash exposes tool failure via isError and foreground completion via interrupted/streams, not exitCode.
100  return typeof r.stdout === 'string' && typeof r.stderr === 'string' && r.interrupted === false ? 'pass' : 'unknown'
101}
102export function isCheck(command: string): boolean {
103  if (/^(?:npx\s+)?vitest\b.*\slist(?:\s|$)/.test(command.trim())) return false
104  // Known introspection-only options do not run the check itself.
105  if (/(?:^|\s)(?:--help|-h|--version|-V|--collect-only|--co|--listTests|--list-tests|--showConfig|--show-config|--list|-list)(?:\s|=|$)/.test(command)) return false
106  // Conservative whole-command allowlist; compound shell programs are not proof of a check.
107  return /^(?:(?:npm|pnpm|yarn) (?:run )?(?:test(?::[\w-]+)?|typecheck|lint)|npx (?:tsc|vitest|jest|eslint)|(?:pytest|vitest|jest|tsc|eslint)|cargo (?:test|check|clippy)|go test)\b[^;&|<>\n]*$/.test(command.trim())
108}
109export function restore<T extends object>(value: unknown, defaults: T): T {
110  const v = object(value); const out = { ...defaults } as Record<string, unknown>
111  for (const [k, fallback] of Object.entries(defaults)) {
112    const item = v[k]
113    if (Array.isArray(fallback) ? Array.isArray(item) : typeof item === typeof fallback && item !== null) out[k] = item
114  }
115  return out as T
116}
117export const entries = (args: string): string[] => args.split('|').map(s => s.trim())
118export function bounded<T>(items: T[]): T[] { return items.slice(-200) }
119// Clean string leaves before JSON serialization, never regex-rewrite serialized JSON syntax.
120export function safeData(value: unknown): unknown {
121  if (typeof value === 'string') return safeText(value)
122  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(safeData)
123  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(value).map(([k, v]) => [k, safeData(v)]))
124  return value
125}
126
127export function reportText(value: unknown): string {
128  const limit = 32 * 1024, notice = '\nINCOMPLETE: report truncated; filter or inspect smaller groups.'
129  const text = safeText(value, limit + 1)
130  return text.length > limit || String(value ?? '').length > limit ? text.slice(0, limit - notice.length) + notice : text
131}
132
hooks/core/feature.ts 22 lines
1import { bounded, isCheck, outcome, restore, safeText, type Observation, type Port } from './runtime.ts'
2type Check = { command: string; result: string; revision?: string; changed: boolean }
3export class Feature {
4  data: { checks: Check[] }
5  constructor(value?: unknown) { this.data = restore(value, { checks: [] as Check[] }) }
6  async observe(e: Observation, _io: Port): Promise<void> {
7    const command = String(e.input.command ?? '').trim()
8    if (e.tool !== 'Bash' || !isCheck(command)) return
9    const check: Check = { command: safeText(command), result: outcome(e.result), revision: e.before, changed: e.before !== e.after }
10    this.data.checks = bounded([...this.data.checks.filter(c => c.command !== check.command), check])
11  }
12  async command(args: string, io: Port): Promise<string> {
13    if (args.trim() === 'help') return '/verify [list | reset] — PASS matches the current content; STALE requires revalidation; UNKNOWN has no complete evidence.'
14    if (args.trim() && args.trim() !== 'list') return 'Usage: /verify [list | reset]'
15    const current = await io.revision()
16    return ['Verify Board — observed checks only; commands are not coverage guarantees.', ...this.data.checks.map(c => {
17      const status = c.result === 'fail' ? 'FAIL' : c.result !== 'pass' || !c.revision || !current ? 'UNKNOWN' : c.changed || c.revision !== current ? 'STALE' : 'PASS'
18      return `${status} ${c.command}`
19    }), ...(this.data.checks.length ? [] : ['No checks observed. Run a verification command.'])].join('\n')
20  }
21}
22
hooks/core/redact.ts 31 lines
1// Canonical source; run node scripts/sync-redactors.mjs after editing.
2// Best-effort removal of obvious secrets from command lines before they are exported.
3const VALUE = String.raw`("(?:\\[\s\S]|[^"\\])*"|'[^']*'|(?:\\[\s\S]|[^\s'"\\])+)`
4const HEADER = String.raw`(?:authorization|[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*-(?:key|token|secret))`
5// Only match user:password arguments, leaving username-only options (e.g. mysql -u) alone.
6const CREDENTIAL = String.raw`("(?:\\[\s\S]|[^":\\])*:(?:\\[\s\S]|[^"\\])*"|'[^':]*:[^']*'|[^\s'":]*:[^\s'"]*)`
7const RULES: [RegExp, string][] = [
8  // Shell-quoted headers must be handled before key/value rules: an escaped quote is
9  // part of the secret, while the opposite quote is ordinary data inside this shell word.
10  [new RegExp(String.raw`("` + HEADER + String.raw`\s*:\s*)(?:\\[\s\S]|[^"\\])*"`, 'gi'), '$1[REDACTED]"'],
11  [new RegExp(String.raw`('` + HEADER + String.raw`\s*:\s*)[^']*'`, 'gi'), "$1[REDACTED]'"],
12  [new RegExp(String.raw`(\b` + HEADER + String.raw`\s*:\s*)(?:\\[\s\S]|[^'"\r\n\\])+`, 'gi'), '$1[REDACTED]'],
13  [new RegExp(String.raw`((?:["']?)(?:password|passwd|pwd|token|(?:access|refresh|id|session|auth)[_-]?token|(?:api|access|secret|private)[_-]?key|client[_-]?secret|secret|authorization|credentials?|cookies?)(?:["']?)\s*:\s*)` + VALUE, 'gi'), '$1[REDACTED]'],
14  [/(\bbearer\s+)[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/gi, '$1[REDACTED]'],
15  [new RegExp(String.raw`(--(?:password|token|api-key|secret)(?:=|\s+))` + VALUE, 'gi'), '$1[REDACTED]'],
16  [/([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/[^\s/:@'"]*:)[^\s/@'"]*@/gi, '$1[REDACTED]@'],
17  [new RegExp(String.raw`(\s(?:--user(?:=|\s+)|-u\s*))` + CREDENTIAL, 'g'), '$1[REDACTED]'],
18  [/(\bmysql\w*\b[^\n;&|]*?\s-p)(?=\S)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+)/g, '$1[REDACTED]'],
19  [new RegExp(String.raw`\b([A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD)[A-Za-z0-9_]*)=` + VALUE, 'gi'), '$1=[REDACTED]'],
20]
21
22export function redactSecrets(text: string): string {
23  return RULES.reduce((out, [pattern, replacement]) => out.replace(pattern, replacement), text)
24}
25
26// Match complete key names, including common camelCase/underscore/hyphen spellings.
27// Do not match ordinary names such as token_count or keyboard.
28export function isSecretKey(key: string): boolean {
29  return /^(?:password|passwd|pwd|authorization|proxyauthorization|apikey|accesskey|secretkey|privatekey|clientsecret|secret|token|accesstoken|refreshtoken|idtoken|sessiontoken|authtoken|credential|credentials|cookie|setcookie)$/i.test(key.replace(/[_\s-]/g, '')) || /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*-(?:key|token|secret)$/i.test(key)
30}
31