SLOPSHOPPER

secrets

Hand Claude an API token without it reading the value: you type it into a field above the prompt, Claude uses it in Bash as $NAME, and it is redacted from…

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★ 1v0.2.0no licenseupdated 2026-10-07crockalet/claude-mods/plugins/secrets
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Preview · a replayed session in a sandbox
claude · ~/work/app · secrets
› fix the failing auth test and add an audit log call ⏺ Read(src/auth.ts) ⎿ Read 6 lines ⏺ Update(src/auth.ts) ⎿ Added 2 lines, removed 1 line ⏺ Bash(bun test) ⎿ 3 pass, 1 fail ● Done. refresh now rejects expired claims and logs an audit event. ✻ Worked for 42s · done 4:20 PM › /secrets ⎿ secrets: No secrets set this session. Claude asks for one with request_secret. ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── › ? for shortcuts
README

secrets

A Claude Code mod for handing Claude an API token without pasting it into the chat.

When Claude needs a secret it calls request_secret with a name like GITHUB_TOKEN and a one-line reason. A field appears above the prompt. You type or paste the value there (ctrl+x tab focuses it, Enter saves it, Cancel declines). Claude only learns that the secret is set. It then writes $GITHUB_TOKEN in its Bash commands, and the mod makes the value available to that command.

  • The value is written to a 0600 file in a private temp folder and exported only into Bash commands that mention $NAME or ${NAME}. The command Claude sees and the transcript never contain the value.
  • Any tool result (subagents' included) or prompt that contains a stored value has it replaced with «secret:NAME».
  • Tool calls that name the secrets folder are refused.
  • When the permission check would ask about a Bash command that uses a secret, you decide in the same band instead of the dialog or auto mode's classifier. It shows who wants the secret (Claude or a subagent) and the command, with Allow once (for a subagent, Allow for this subagent: the rest of its run, until it finishes), Allow $NAME this session and Deny. An approval nobody answers is denied after 10 minutes. Commands your rules already allow or deny are left alone, and so is an ask your organization caps.
  • Secrets last for the session. The folder is deleted when the session ends.

Mods need Claude Code 2.1.287 or later.

Threat model

This stops accidental exposure: a token pasted into a prompt, echoed in a log, printed by a failing curl -v or saved in the transcript. It does not stop a model that deliberately tries to get the value out, for example by base64-encoding it, sending it over the network or splitting it across outputs. The field shows what you type as plain text, so mind your screen.

A known value typed or pasted into the main prompt is replaced with «secret:NAME» as it lands in the box, and again in every row before the transcript stores it. Still, use the field above the prompt. The prompt box is the fallback, not the way in.

Known limits

  • Allow $NAME this session means any later command using that secret runs unchecked, including one that sends it somewhere else. Allow once unless you trust the work that follows. /secrets lists the session allowances; /secrets forget, /secrets clear and entering a new value end them.
  • The approval only covers Bash commands that name a secret as $NAME. A command that reaches the value some other way gets the normal permission check, and auto mode's classifier may still refuse it.
  • If a session crashes, the end-of-session cleanup doesn't run and the secrets folder stays in your user-only $TMPDIR until the OS clears it.

Install

/plugin marketplace add crockalet/claude-mods
/plugin install secrets@claude-mods

Usage

  • Ask Claude for something that needs a token. It calls request_secret and the field appears above the prompt.
  • /secrets lists the names set this session and which are allowed without asking. It never shows values.
  • /secrets forget NAME removes one, and /secrets clear removes all of them.

Developing

claude --plugin-dir plugins/secrets   # hot-reloads on save
claude plugin validate plugins/secrets
claude plugin test plugins/secrets
Source 2 files
hooks/register.tsx 415 lines
1import { atom, read, update } from 'claude-code'
2import type { EngineInterface, Register, ToolCallResult } from 'claude-code'
3
4import type { SecretApproval, SecretAsk } from '../types'
5
6type $ = EngineInterface
7type Secret = [name: string, value: string]
8type Answer = 'set' | 'declined'
9type Approval = 'once' | 'session' | 'deny'
10
11const TOOL = 'mcp__secrets__request_secret'
12const NAME = /^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*$/
13const WAIT_LIMIT_MS = 30 * 60_000
14const APPROVAL_LIMIT_MS = 10 * 60_000
15const MIN_REDACT = 4
16
17const dirRef = atom({ plugin: 'secrets', key: 'dir' } as const, null)
18const namesRef = atom({ plugin: 'secrets', key: 'names' } as const, [])
19const asksRef = atom({ plugin: 'secrets', key: 'asks' } as const, [])
20const approvalsRef = atom({ plugin: 'secrets', key: 'approvals' } as const, [])
21const allowedRef = atom({ plugin: 'secrets', key: 'allowed' } as const, [])
22
23const GUIDANCE = [
24  `When a task needs a secret (an API token, a password, a key), call ${TOOL} with an env-style name and a one-line reason`,
25  'instead of asking the person to paste it into the chat or to export it in a terminal.',
26  'Once it is set, reference it only as $NAME (or ${NAME}) inside Bash commands: the value is injected there and redacted from output.',
27  'Never echo, print, encode or write the value anywhere, and never read the file it is stored in.',
28  'If a permission check denies a command that uses a secret, report the denial instead of changing settings or permissions.',
29].join(' ')
30
31// A hot reload resets module variables; the files under the state's dir are the source of truth.
32const values = new Map<string, string>()
33
34const str = (value: unknown): string => (typeof value === 'string' ? value : '')
35
36const ensureDir = async ($: $): Promise<string> => {
37  const known = await read($, dirRef)
38  if (known) return known
39  const made = await $.process.run(['mktemp', '-d'])
40  const dir = made.stdout.trim()
41  if (made.exitCode !== 0 || !dir) throw new Error(`mktemp failed: ${made.stderr.trim()}`)
42  await update($, dirRef, () => dir)
43
44  return dir
45}
46
47const store = async ($: $, name: string, value: string) => {
48  const dir = await ensureDir($)
49  // umask before cat, so the file is never readable by others even for a moment.
50  const wrote = await $.process.run(['sh', '-c', 'umask 077 && cat > "$1"', 'sh', `${dir}/${name}`], { stdin: value })
51  if (wrote.exitCode !== 0) throw new Error(`could not save ${name}: ${wrote.stderr.trim()}`)
52  values.set(name, value)
53  await update($, namesRef, list => (list.includes(name) ? list : [...list, name]))
54  await update($, allowedRef, list => list.filter(n => n !== name))
55  for (const run of runAllowed.values()) run.delete(name)
56}
57
58const forget = async ($: $, names: string[]) => {
59  const dir = await read($, dirRef)
60  if (dir && names.length > 0) await $.process.run(['rm', '-f', ...names.map(n => `${dir}/${n}`)])
61  for (const n of names) values.delete(n)
62  await update($, namesRef, list => list.filter(n => !names.includes(n)))
63  await update($, allowedRef, list => list.filter(n => !names.includes(n)))
64  for (const run of runAllowed.values()) for (const n of names) run.delete(n)
65}
66
67const secrets = async ($: $): Promise<Secret[]> => {
68  const dir = await read($, dirRef)
69  if (!dir) return []
70  const found: Secret[] = []
71  for (const name of await read($, namesRef)) {
72    if (!values.has(name)) {
73      const got = await $.process.run(['cat', `${dir}/${name}`])
74      if (got.exitCode === 0) values.set(name, got.stdout)
75    }
76    const value = values.get(name)
77    if (value !== undefined) found.push([name, value])
78  }
79
80  return found
81}
82
83const scrub = (v: unknown, list: Secret[], hits: { n: number }): unknown => {
84  if (typeof v === 'string') {
85    let out = v
86    for (const [name, value] of list) {
87      if (!out.includes(value)) continue
88      hits.n += 1
89      out = out.split(value).join(`«secret:${name}»`)
90    }
91    return out
92  }
93  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.map(x => scrub(x, list, hits))
94  if (v && typeof v === 'object') return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(v).map(([k, x]) => [k, scrub(x, list, hits)]))
95
96  return v
97}
98
99// Longest first, so a value that contains another is replaced whole.
100const redactable = (list: Secret[]) => list.filter(([, v]) => v.length >= MIN_REDACT).sort((a, b) => b[1].length - a[1].length)
101
102const redact = (r: ToolCallResult, list: Secret[]): ToolCallResult => {
103  if (r.deny !== undefined || list.length === 0) return r
104  const hits = { n: 0 }
105  const result = scrub(r.result, list, hits)
106  const text = r.text === undefined ? undefined : (scrub(r.text, list, hits) as string)
107  const context = r.context?.map(c => scrub(c, list, hits) as string)
108  if (hits.n === 0) return r
109  if (r.isError) return { deny: text ?? (typeof result === 'string' ? result : JSON.stringify(result)) }
110
111  // Without ref, so core maps the scrubbed result instead of reusing its own messages.
112  return context ? { result, context } : { result }
113}
114
115const mentions = (command: string, name: string) => new RegExp(`\\$\\{?${name}(?![A-Za-z0-9_])`).test(command)
116
117const INJECTED = /^(export [A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*="\$\(cat '[^']*'\)"; )+/
118
119// tool.check may see the command before or after tool.call added the export prefix.
120const uses = (command: string, name: string) => mentions(command, name) || command.includes(`export ${name}="$(cat '`)
121
122// A state read inside the waiting hook does not see the press's write, so the answer travels through the module.
123const answers = new Map<string, Answer>()
124
125const decide = async ($: $, id: string, answer: Answer) => {
126  answers.set(id, answer)
127  await update($, asksRef, list => list.filter(a => a.id !== id))
128}
129
130const submit = async ($: $, ask: SecretAsk, typed: string) => {
131  const value = typed.trim()
132  if (!value) {
133    $.ui.toast(`Type a value for ${ask.name} first, or press Cancel`)
134    return
135  }
136  await store($, ask.name, value)
137  await decide($, ask.id, 'set')
138}
139
140const approvalAnswers = new Map<string, Approval>()
141// Allow once for a subagent covers the rest of its run, until its turn.complete.
142const runAllowed = new Map<string, Set<string>>()
143
144const coveredByRun = (agentId: string | null, names: string[]) =>
145  agentId !== null && names.every(n => runAllowed.get(agentId)?.has(n))
146
147const answerApproval = async ($: $, approval: SecretApproval, answer: Approval) => {
148  approvalAnswers.set(approval.id, answer)
149  if (answer === 'session') await update($, allowedRef, list => [...new Set([...list, ...approval.names])])
150  if (answer === 'once' && approval.agentId) {
151    runAllowed.set(approval.agentId, new Set([...(runAllowed.get(approval.agentId) ?? []), ...approval.names]))
152  }
153  const allowed = await read($, allowedRef)
154  // Parallel calls from the same run queue several approvals; one answer settles those it now covers.
155  const settled = (await read($, approvalsRef)).filter(
156    a => a.id === approval.id || (answer !== 'deny' && (a.names.every(n => allowed.includes(n)) || coveredByRun(a.agentId, a.names))),
157  )
158  for (const a of settled) if (a.id !== approval.id) approvalAnswers.set(a.id, answer === 'session' ? 'session' : 'once')
159  await update($, approvalsRef, list => list.filter(a => !settled.some(s => s.id === a.id)))
160}
161
162const vars = (names: string[]) => names.map(n => `$${n}`).join(', ')
163
164// The person, not the mode's decider, settles an ask on a command that uses a secret.
165const approve = async ($: $, names: string[], command: string, agentId: string | null, signal: AbortSignal) => {
166  const now = await $.clock.now()
167  const id = `${now}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 7)}`
168  const shown = command.replace(INJECTED, '')
169  await update($, approvalsRef, list => [...list, { id, names, command: shown.length > 200 ? `${shown.slice(0, 199)}…` : shown, agentId, at: now }])
170  $.ui.toast(`${agentId ? 'A subagent' : 'Claude'} wants to use ${vars(names)}: answer above the prompt`)
171
172  let answer: Approval | undefined
173  while (answer === undefined && !signal.aborted && (await $.clock.now()) - now < APPROVAL_LIMIT_MS) {
174    await $.process.run(['sleep', '1'])
175    answer = approvalAnswers.get(id)
176  }
177  approvalAnswers.delete(id)
178  await update($, approvalsRef, list => list.filter(a => a.id !== id))
179
180  if (answer === 'once' || answer === 'session') return { decision: 'allow' as const, reason: `The person allowed ${vars(names)} for this command.` }
181  if (answer === 'deny') return { decision: 'deny' as const, reason: `The person denied using ${vars(names)} for this command.` }
182
183  return { decision: 'deny' as const, reason: `No answer from the person about using ${vars(names)}${signal.aborted ? '' : ' within 10 minutes'}.` }
184}
185
186const requestSecret = async ($: $, e: Record<string, unknown>, signal: AbortSignal) => {
187  const name = str(e.name).trim()
188  if (!NAME.test(name)) return { deny: 'name must be an env-style name such as GITHUB_TOKEN: A-Z, 0-9 and _, not starting with a digit.' }
189  const why = str(e.why).replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim().slice(0, 200)
190  const now = await $.clock.now()
191  const id = `${now}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 7)}`
192  await update($, asksRef, list => [...list, { id, name, why, at: now }])
193  $.ui.toast(`Claude needs ${name}: enter it above the prompt`)
194
195  // Waiting inside the hook counts against its budget; time inside a $ call does not.
196  let answer: Answer | undefined
197  while (answer === undefined && !signal.aborted && (await $.clock.now()) - now < WAIT_LIMIT_MS) {
198    await $.process.run(['sleep', '1'])
199    answer = answers.get(id)
200  }
201  answers.delete(id)
202  await update($, asksRef, list => list.filter(a => a.id !== id))
203
204  if (answer === 'set') return { result: `${name} is set. Use $${name} in Bash commands; its value is injected and redacted from output. Never try to print or read it.` }
205  if (answer === 'declined') return { result: `The person declined to provide ${name}. Continue without it or ask them how to proceed; do not ask for it to be pasted.` }
206
207  return { result: signal.aborted ? `Interrupted before the person entered ${name}.` : `No value for ${name} after 30 minutes.` }
208}
209
210export const register: Register = on => {
211  on('session.start', async ($, e, next) => {
212    const started = await next(e)
213    await $.tool.register({
214      name: 'request_secret',
215      description:
216        'Ask the person for a secret (API token, password, key) through a private field in their UI. Blocks until they enter it or decline. The value never reaches you: afterwards use it as $NAME in Bash commands.',
217      inputSchema: {
218        type: 'object',
219        properties: {
220          name: { type: 'string', description: 'Env-style variable name, e.g. GITHUB_TOKEN' },
221          why: { type: 'string', description: 'One line shown to the person: what it is for' },
222        },
223        required: ['name', 'why'],
224      },
225    })
226    await $.command.register({
227      name: 'secrets',
228      description: 'List the secrets set this session; `/secrets forget NAME` or `/secrets clear` removes them',
229      argumentHint: '[forget NAME | clear]',
230    })
231
232    return started
233  })
234
235  on('session.end', async ($, e, next) => {
236    const dir = await read($, dirRef)
237    if (dir) await $.process.run(['rm', '-rf', dir])
238    values.clear()
239    await update($, dirRef, () => null)
240    await update($, namesRef, () => [])
241    await update($, allowedRef, () => [])
242    runAllowed.clear()
243    await update($, approvalsRef, () => [])
244
245    return next(e)
246  })
247
248  on('prompt.compose', async ($, e, next) => {
249    const composed = await next(e)
250
251    return { sections: [...composed.sections, { id: 'secrets:guidance', text: GUIDANCE, scope: 'session' }] }
252  })
253
254  // prompt.compose carries no agentId, so nothing shows a subagent's system prompt gets the section; its task prompt does.
255  on('agent.spawn', async ($, e, next) => {
256    const names = await read($, namesRef)
257    const provided = names.length > 0 ? ` The person provided ${names.join(', ')} through the secrets mod this session; use ${names.map(n => `$${n}`).join(', ')} in Bash.` : ''
258
259    return next({ ...e, prompt: `${e.prompt}\n\n${GUIDANCE}${provided}` })
260  })
261
262  // The earliest point: a queued prompt's raw text reaches the transcript file before prompt.submit can scrub it.
263  on('prompt.edit', async ($, e, next) => {
264    const list = redactable(await secrets($))
265    if (list.length === 0) return next(e)
266    const hits = { n: 0 }
267    const inputText = scrub(e.inputText, list, hits) as string
268    const r = await next(hits.n > 0 ? { ...e, inputText } : e)
269    // A value typed key by key only shows up whole in the draft it completes.
270    const text = scrub(r.text, list, hits) as string
271    if (hits.n === 0) return r
272    $.ui.toast('secrets: replaced a secret value in your prompt with its name', { timeoutMs: 8000 })
273    if (text === r.text) return r
274    const cursor = Math.max(0, Math.min(text.length, text.length - (r.text.length - r.cursor)))
275
276    // Decorations were laid over the old text's offsets.
277    const { decorations: _, ...box } = r
278
279    return { ...box, text, cursor }
280  })
281
282  on('session.append', async ($, e, next) => {
283    const list = redactable(await secrets($))
284    const hits = { n: 0 }
285    const content = list.length > 0 ? (scrub(e.message.content, list, hits) as typeof e.message.content) : e.message.content
286
287    return next(hits.n > 0 ? { ...e, message: { ...e.message, content } } : e)
288  })
289
290  on('prompt.submit', async ($, e, next) => {
291    const hits = { n: 0 }
292    const text = scrub(e.text, redactable(await secrets($)), hits) as string
293    if (hits.n === 0) return next(e)
294    $.ui.toast('secrets: replaced a secret value in your prompt with its name', { timeoutMs: 8000 })
295
296    return next({ ...e, text })
297  })
298
299  // A subagent's call to a plugin tool is answered only by a hook matched on that tool.
300  on('tool.call', { tool: TOOL }, async ($, e, next) => requestSecret($, e as Record<string, unknown>, next.signal))
301
302  on('tool.call', async ($, e, next) => {
303    if (String(e.tool) === TOOL) return next(e)
304    const dir = await read($, dirRef)
305    if (!dir) return next(e)
306    const tag = dir.split('/').filter(Boolean).pop() ?? dir
307    if (JSON.stringify(e).includes(tag)) {
308      return { deny: 'secrets: that path holds secret values. Reference a secret as $NAME in a Bash command instead of reading its file.' }
309    }
310    const list = await secrets($)
311    if (e.tool !== 'Bash') return redact(await next(e), redactable(list))
312    const used = list.filter(([name]) => mentions(e.command, name))
313    const prefix = used.map(([name]) => `export ${name}="$(cat '${dir}/${name}')"; `).join('')
314
315    return redact(await next(prefix ? { ...e, command: prefix + e.command } : e), redactable(list))
316  }).catch(($, e, next) => (next.called ? next(e) : { deny: 'secrets: its guard failed, so the call was refused.' }))
317
318  on('turn.complete', async ($, e, next) => {
319    if (e.agentId !== undefined) runAllowed.delete(e.agentId)
320
321    return next(e)
322  })
323
324  on('tool.check', { tool: 'Bash' }, async ($, e, next) => {
325    const verdict = await next(e)
326    // An organization's ceiling below allow is not ours to lift.
327    if (verdict.decision !== 'ask' || (e.ceiling !== undefined && e.ceiling !== 'allow')) return verdict
328    const command = str((e.input as { command?: unknown } | null)?.command)
329    const names = (await read($, namesRef)).filter(n => uses(command, n))
330    if (names.length === 0) return verdict
331    const allowed = await read($, allowedRef)
332    if (names.every(n => allowed.includes(n))) return { decision: 'allow', reason: `The person allowed ${vars(names)} for this session.` }
333    if (coveredByRun(e.agentId ?? null, names)) return { decision: 'allow', reason: `The person allowed ${vars(names)} for this subagent's run.` }
334
335    return approve($, names, command, e.agentId ?? null, next.signal)
336  }).catch(() => ({ decision: 'deny', reason: 'secrets: the approval check failed, so the call was refused.' }))
337
338  on('command.run', { command: 'secrets' }, async ($, e) => {
339    const [verb = '', arg = ''] = e.args.trim().split(/\s+/)
340    const names = await read($, namesRef)
341    if (verb === 'clear') {
342      await forget($, names)
343      return { text: names.length > 0 ? `Removed ${names.join(', ')}.` : 'No secrets were set.' }
344    }
345    if (verb === 'forget') {
346      if (!names.includes(arg)) return { text: `No secret named ${arg || '(none given)'}. Set: ${names.join(', ') || 'none'}.` }
347      await forget($, [arg])
348      return { text: `Removed ${arg}.` }
349    }
350    if (names.length === 0) return { text: 'No secrets set this session. Claude asks for one with request_secret.' }
351
352    const allowed = (await read($, allowedRef)).filter(n => names.includes(n))
353    const always = allowed.length > 0 ? ` Allowed without asking this session: ${allowed.join(', ')}.` : ''
354
355    return { text: `Secrets set this session: ${names.join(', ')}. Values are never shown.${always}` }
356  })
357
358  on('ui.render', { component: 'AbovePrompt' }, async ($, e, next) => {
359    const waiting = await read($, asksRef)
360    const approvals = await read($, approvalsRef)
361    const ask = waiting[0]
362    const approval = approvals[0]
363    const elements = $.ui.resolve(e)
364    if ((!ask && !approval) || e.props.hasSurvey || !('Input' in elements)) return next(e)
365    const { Box, Text, Button, Input } = elements
366    const queued = waiting.length + approvals.length - 1
367    const more = queued > 0 ? ` ${queued} more waiting.` : ''
368
369    if (!ask && approval) {
370      const who = approval.agentId ? 'A subagent' : 'Claude'
371      const hint = e.surface === 'terminal' ? 'ctrl+x tab to choose. ' : ''
372      return (
373        <Box flexDirection="column">
374          <Text>
375            <Text color="warning">● </Text>
376            {who} wants to use <Text bold>{vars(approval.names)}</Text>
377          </Text>
378          <Text dimColor wrap="truncate-end">
379            {'  $ '}
380            {approval.command}
381          </Text>
382          <Text dimColor>
383            {hint}A session allowance lets any command using it run unchecked.{more}
384          </Text>
385          <Box columnGap={1} flexWrap="wrap">
386            <Button key={`approve-${approval.id}-once`} hotkey="1" variant="primary" label={approval.agentId ? 'Allow for this subagent' : 'Allow once'} onPress={() => answerApproval($, approval, 'once')} />
387            <Button key={`approve-${approval.id}-session`} hotkey="2" label={`Allow ${vars(approval.names)} this session`} onPress={() => answerApproval($, approval, 'session')} />
388            <Button key={`approve-${approval.id}-deny`} hotkey="3" label="Deny" onPress={() => answerApproval($, approval, 'deny')} />
389          </Box>
390        </Box>
391      )
392    }
393    if (!ask) return next(e)
394    const isSet = (await read($, namesRef)).includes(ask.name)
395    const hint = e.surface === 'terminal' ? 'ctrl+x tab to type here, Enter to save' : 'Enter to save'
396
397    return (
398      <Box flexDirection="column">
399        <Text>
400          <Text color="warning">● </Text>Claude needs <Text bold>{ask.name}</Text>
401          {ask.why ? ` · ${ask.why}` : ''}
402        </Text>
403        <Text dimColor>
404          {hint}. Shown here as plain text; Claude never sees it.{isSet ? ' Replaces the current value.' : ''}
405          {more}
406        </Text>
407        <Input key={`secret-${ask.id}`} label={`${ask.name}=`} placeholder="paste the value…" submitLabel="save" autoFocus onSubmit={v => submit($, ask, v)} />
408        <Box>
409          <Button key={`secret-${ask.id}-cancel`} label="Cancel" onPress={() => decide($, ask.id, 'declined')} />
410        </Box>
411      </Box>
412    )
413  })
414}
415
types/index.d.ts 18 lines
1export type SecretAsk = { id: string; name: string; why: string; at: number }
2
3export type SecretApproval = { id: string; names: string[]; command: string; agentId: string | null; at: number }
4
5declare module 'claude-code' {
6  interface PluginState {
7    secrets: {
8      // Values live only in files under dir; state keeps what a hot reload needs to find them.
9      dir: string | null
10      names: string[]
11      asks: SecretAsk[]
12      approvals: SecretApproval[]
13      // Names whose Bash commands skip the approval band until forgotten, replaced or the session ends.
14      allowed: string[]
15    }
16  }
17}
18