SLOPSHOPPER

secret-guard

Denies writing secret files, committing secrets, and pushing to main or force pushing.

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claude · ~/work/app · secret-guard
› fix the failing auth test and add an audit log call ⏺ Read(src/auth.ts) ⎿ Read 6 lines ⏺ Update(src/auth.ts) ⎿ Added 2 lines, removed 1 line ⏺ Bash(rm -rf build && git push --force origin main) ⎿ Denied by secret-guard: secret-guard: git push blocked: force pushes are not allowed here; push normally o ● Done. refresh now rejects expired claims and logs an audit event. ✻ Worked for 42s · done 4:20 PM ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── › ? for shortcuts
README

secret-guard

Stops secrets being written, committed or pushed.

Refuses to write .env, .pem, SSH keys and credentials files, refuses commands that contain API keys or high-entropy tokens, blocks git add/commit of staged secrets, and blocks pushes to main/master and force pushes. .env.example-style files are allowed.

Install

/plugin marketplace add cloudcruncher/claude-mod-garage
/plugin install secret-guard@mod-garage

Run /reload-plugins (or restart Claude Code) afterwards. To try it from a local clone without installing: claude --plugin-dir ./dev-mods/secret-guard

Use it

  • Automatic once installed.

What you'll see

Illustrative output.

Model tries to write .env

secret-guard: refusing to write .env. .env is an environment file that usually holds secrets. Use a .env.example with placeholder values, or ask the user to edit it.

Model tries to push

secret-guard: git push blocked: pushing to main is not allowed.

Notes

  • Fails closed: if the guard itself errors, the write or git command is blocked.
Source 2 files
hooks/register.ts 76 lines
1import type { Register, EngineInterface } from 'claude-code'
2import {
3  addedLines, findSecret, gitOps, isBroadStage, pushDenyReason, secretPathReason, type GitOp,
4} from './lib.ts'
5
6type Engine = EngineInterface
7
8async function git($: Engine, args: string[]): Promise<string> {
9  const r = await $.process.run(['git', ...args], { timeoutMs: 15000 })
10  return r.exitCode === 0 ? r.stdout : ''
11}
12
13/** Looks at what a git add or commit would record; returns a deny reason or undefined. */
14async function stagedProblem($: Engine, op: GitOp): Promise<string | undefined> {
15  const chunks: string[] = []
16  if (op.kind === 'commit') {
17    chunks.push(addedLines(await git($, ['diff', '--cached', '--no-color'])))
18    if (isBroadStage(op)) chunks.push(addedLines(await git($, ['diff', '--no-color'])))
19  } else {
20    // git add: scan the working tree changes it could pick up
21    chunks.push(addedLines(await git($, ['diff', '--no-color'])))
22    const status = await git($, ['status', '--porcelain', '--untracked-files=all'])
23    const files = status.split('\n').filter(l => l.length > 3).map(l => l.slice(3).replace(/^"|"$/g, ''))
24    const named = op.args.filter(a => !a.startsWith('-'))
25    const wanted = isBroadStage(op) ? files : files.filter(f => named.some(n => f === n || f.startsWith(`${n.replace(/\/$/, '')}/`)))
26    for (const f of wanted.slice(0, 50)) {
27      const why = secretPathReason(f)
28      if (why) return `git add would stage ${f}: ${why}`
29      if (status.includes(`?? ${f}`)) {
30        const text = await $.fs.read(f).catch(() => '')
31        if (typeof text === 'string') chunks.push(text)
32      }
33    }
34    const stagedNames = (await git($, ['diff', '--cached', '--name-only'])).split('\n').filter(Boolean)
35    for (const f of stagedNames) {
36      const why = secretPathReason(f)
37      if (why) return `${f} is already staged: ${why}`
38    }
39  }
40  const hit = findSecret(chunks.join('\n'))
41  return hit ? `content to be recorded looks like a secret (${hit})` : undefined
42}
43
44export const register: Register = on => {
45  for (const tool of ['Write', 'Edit', 'MultiEdit', 'NotebookEdit'] as const) {
46    on('tool.call', { tool }, ($, e, next) => {
47      const path = tool === 'NotebookEdit' ? (e as { notebook_path?: string }).notebook_path : (e as { file_path?: string }).file_path
48      const why = path ? secretPathReason(path) : undefined
49      return why
50        ? { deny: `secret-guard: refusing to write ${path}. ${why}. Use a .env.example with placeholder values, or ask the user to edit it.` }
51        : next(e)
52    }).catch(($, e, next) => (next.called ? next(e) : { deny: 'secret-guard: the guard failed, so the write was blocked.' }))
53  }
54
55  on('tool.call', { tool: 'Bash' }, async ($, e, next) => {
56    const ops = gitOps(e.command)
57    if (ops.length === 0) return next(e)
58
59    const inline = findSecret(e.command)
60    if (inline && ops.some(o => o.kind !== 'push')) {
61      return { deny: `secret-guard: the command itself contains what looks like a secret (${inline}). Remove it and use an environment variable.` }
62    }
63    for (const op of ops) {
64      if (op.kind === 'push') {
65        const branch = (await git($, ['rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD'])).trim() || undefined
66        const why = pushDenyReason(op.args, branch)
67        if (why) return { deny: `secret-guard: git push blocked: ${why}.` }
68      } else {
69        const why = await stagedProblem($, op)
70        if (why) return { deny: `secret-guard: git ${op.kind} blocked: ${why}. Remove the secret, rotate it if it was ever real, and retry.` }
71      }
72    }
73    return next(e)
74  }).catch(($, e, next) => (next.called ? next(e) : { deny: 'secret-guard: the guard failed, so the git command was blocked.' }))
75}
76
hooks/lib.ts 132 lines
1// Pure pattern logic for secret-guard.
2
3const EXAMPLE_SUFFIX = /\.(example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/i
4
5function baseName(path: string): string {
6  return path.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? path
7}
8
9/** Returns why a path is a secret file, or undefined when it is fine to write. */
10export function secretPathReason(path: string): string | undefined {
11  const name = baseName(path)
12  const lower = name.toLowerCase()
13  if (EXAMPLE_SUFFIX.test(lower)) return undefined
14  if (lower === '.env' || lower.startsWith('.env.')) return `${name} is an environment file that usually holds secrets`
15  if (lower.endsWith('.pem')) return `${name} is a PEM key or certificate file`
16  if (/\.(p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$/.test(lower)) return `${name} is a key store`
17  if (/^id_[a-z0-9_]+$/.test(lower)) return `${name} looks like an SSH private key`
18  if (/^(\.?credentials|\.git-credentials)(\..*)?$/.test(lower) || lower === 'credentials.json') {
19    return `${name} is a credentials file`
20  }
21  return undefined
22}
23
24export function shannonEntropy(s: string): number {
25  if (s.length === 0) return 0
26  const counts = new Map<string, number>()
27  for (const ch of s) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
28  let h = 0
29  for (const c of counts.values()) {
30    const p = c / s.length
31    h -= p * Math.log2(p)
32  }
33  return h
34}
35
36const FIXED_PATTERNS: { label: string; re: RegExp }[] = [
37  { label: 'AWS access key id', re: /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/ },
38  { label: 'GitHub token', re: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/ },
39  { label: 'GitHub fine-grained token', re: /\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/ },
40  { label: 'Anthropic API key', re: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/ },
41  { label: 'API secret key (sk-)', re: /\bsk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}/ },
42  { label: 'private key block', re: /-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z]+ )?PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----/ },
43  { label: 'Slack token', re: /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/ },
44]
45
46const ASSIGNMENT =
47  /\b[\w.-]*(?:secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|auth)[\w.-]*\s*[:=]\s*["']?([A-Za-z0-9+/_\-=.]{20,})["']?/i
48
49const PLACEHOLDER = /(example|placeholder|changeme|your[_-]|<.*>|xxxx|\$\{|\$\(|process\.env|dummy|redacted)/i
50
51/** Returns a label for the first secret-looking thing in the text, or undefined. */
52export function findSecret(text: string): string | undefined {
53  for (const { label, re } of FIXED_PATTERNS) if (re.test(text)) return label
54  for (const line of text.split('\n')) {
55    const m = ASSIGNMENT.exec(line)
56    const value = m?.[1]
57    if (value === undefined) continue
58    if (PLACEHOLDER.test(line)) continue
59    if (shannonEntropy(value) >= 3.8) return 'high-entropy token in an assignment'
60  }
61  return undefined
62}
63
64/** The added lines of a unified diff, without the leading plus. */
65export function addedLines(diff: string): string {
66  return diff
67    .split('\n')
68    .filter(l => l.startsWith('+') && !l.startsWith('+++'))
69    .map(l => l.slice(1))
70    .join('\n')
71}
72
73export type GitOp = { kind: 'commit' | 'add' | 'push'; args: string[] }
74
75/** Same-length copy with heredoc bodies and quoted text blanked, so words inside them are not read as commands. */
76function maskLiterals(command: string): string {
77  const blank = (t: string): string => t.replace(/[^\n]/g, '_')
78  return command
79    .replace(/(<<-?\s*(["']?)(\w+)\2[^\n]*\n)([\s\S]*?)(\n\s*\3(?=\n|$))/g, (_m, head: string, _q, _id, body: string, tail: string) => head + blank(body) + tail)
80    .replace(/"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"|'[^']*'/g, m => m[0] + blank(m.slice(1, -1)) + m[m.length - 1])
81}
82
83/** Finds git commit/add/push invocations in a shell command line. */
84export function gitOps(command: string): GitOp[] {
85  const ops: GitOp[] = []
86  const masked = maskLiterals(command)
87  let offset = 0
88  for (const segment of masked.split(/&&|\|\||;|\n/)) {
89    const start = masked.indexOf(segment, offset)
90    offset = start + segment.length
91    // git must be the command itself, not a word inside an argument
92    const m = /^\s*(?:\w+=\S*\s+)*git\s+(?:-C\s+\S+\s+|-c\s+\S+\s+)*(commit|add|push)\b(.*)$/s.exec(segment)
93    if (!m) continue
94    const rest = command.slice(start + segment.length - (m[2] ?? '').length, start + segment.length)
95    const args = rest.match(/"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+/g) ?? []
96    ops.push({ kind: m[1] as GitOp['kind'], args: args.map(a => a.replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '')) })
97  }
98  return ops
99}
100
101const PROTECTED_BRANCH = /^(?:main|master)$/
102
103/** Returns a deny reason for a git push, or undefined when it is allowed. */
104export function pushDenyReason(args: string[], currentBranch?: string): string | undefined {
105  const isForce = args.some(
106    a => a === '-f' || /^--force(?:-with-lease|-if-includes)?(?:=.*)?$/.test(a) || /^\+\S/.test(a) ||
107      (/^-[a-zA-Z]+$/.test(a) && a.includes('f')),
108  )
109  if (isForce) return 'force pushes are not allowed here; push normally or ask the user to do it'
110  const positional = args.filter(a => !a.startsWith('-'))
111  const refspecs = positional.slice(1) // first positional is the remote
112  const targets = refspecs.map(r => (r.includes(':') ? (r.split(':').pop() ?? '') : r))
113  if (targets.some(t => PROTECTED_BRANCH.test(t.replace(/^refs\/heads\//, '')))) {
114    return 'pushing to main or master is blocked; push a branch and open a pull request'
115  }
116  if (refspecs.length === 0 && currentBranch !== undefined && PROTECTED_BRANCH.test(currentBranch)) {
117    return `you are on ${currentBranch}; pushing to main or master is blocked`
118  }
119  if (args.includes('--all') || args.includes('--mirror')) {
120    return 'pushing all refs would include main or master; push a named branch instead'
121  }
122  return undefined
123}
124
125/** True when a `git add` or `git commit` could pick up files beyond those it names. */
126export function isBroadStage(op: GitOp): boolean {
127  if (op.kind === 'commit') {
128    return op.args.some(a => a === '-a' || a === '--all' || /^-[a-zA-Z]*a[a-zA-Z]*$/.test(a))
129  }
130  return op.args.some(a => ['.', '-A', '--all', '-u', '--update', ':/'].includes(a))
131}
132